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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
In December 1990, NASA Headquarters requested that JSC develop a plan to help
senior agency management determine which path to follow to meet the nation's
future human transportation needs. In August 1991, JSC initiated the Human
Transportation System (HTS) study, a comprehensive study assembling the
combined resources of NASA, Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Martin
Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, and Rockwell under a NASA-Industry Team (NIT).
This study quantified those parameters, for existing and alternative transportation
architectures, which were felt to be important to senior agency management in
deciding how to best meet the nation's transportation needs. These parameters
were: cost, safety, cost risk, probability of mission success, launch schedule
confidence, and environmental impact. The customer for this data is the NASA
administrator, or the agent he designates.
This Executive Summary:
(a) summarizes the findings of the study that compared potential architecture
options which satisfy the missions that are projected from the present to the year
2020 and;
(b) briefly illustrates the study process and depth of the technical data that
characterize the HTS findings on the architecture options considered, including
evolving the current launch systems, augmenting the Space Shuttle with new
systems (alternate access), and replacing the Space Shuttle with a combination of
new and existing systems.
(c) presents architecture results as a function of a parametric mission model. This
indudes space activity levels both with and without Space Station Freedom (SSF).
The Executive Summary is divided into three parts. Part I provides a study
overview and lists the principal study results. Part II describes the study process,
including the definition and calculation methodology of the six major attributes.
Finally, Part UI provides overall architecture scores and the associated attribute data
for these architectures.
The in-depth discussion of these options, as well as detailed descriptions of the
processes, analyses, and systems used in the HTS study to identify and quantify the
cost versus benefit trades of each option, is contained in the HTS Study Final Report,
NASA TM-104779.
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SECFION 2
STUDY APPROACH AND GROUND R UL_
From the beginning of the study, it was recognized that if this study was to build
upon the results of previous studies (and to address the limitations of these studies),
it was essential to have broad NASA and industry participation to assess the best
data from previous concept design efforts. Also, since there was interest in
determining just what convergence existed in the data so that future resources could
be better focused on those areas with the highest potential pay-off, it was determined
that the study approach should involve the best minds in the business, both in and
out of the government. It was determined that a partnership between NASA and
industry was essential, and hence the NASA-Industry Team (NIT) concept was
formed. This approach involved six major aerospace firms working together with
NASA to provide technical data to address the architectural considerations. These
six firms were selected by competitive process through an agency-wide evaluation to
participate in the NIT. These included Boeing, General Dynamics, Martin Marietta,
Rockwell, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas. NASA centers working together to
complete the NIT included the Johnson Space Center, Langley Research Center,
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and Kennedy Space Center, as well as NASA
Headquarters. The industry team members conducted their study efforts under
contracts of $ 425k each, for a total of $ 2550k.
2.1 STUDY APPROACH
The study was divided into four tasks. The first two tasks involved determining the
transportation needs and transportation attributes. This essentially formed the
input requirements for the study. The third task was to evaluate the candidate
architectures. The fourth task was an evaluation of NASA's current business
practices which may be hindering, to some degree, the ability to develop, procure,
and operate any next human transportation system. These four tasks are described
in more detail in the following paragraphs.
I_ _i
z _
2.1.1 Task 1: Transportation Needs
From the outset, it was felt that the mission of any next human transportation
system must be understood in terms of the transportation jobs that it must
accomplish. These jobs are the requirements which define what payloads need to be
transported and when. This indicated a needs-based study approach, as opposed to a
capabilities-based approach. Furthermore, the best solution for human trans-
portation cannot be developed without taking into consideration the transportation
of cargo, since optimization of the transportation attributes may require the use of
commonality between the personnel and cargo transportation
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ii (
• :i• ¸
u"
systems. In addition, addressing current national questions as to whether any new
system was required as a replacement for the Space Shuttle_ or whether a new
system is required to operate in conjunction with the Space Shuttle to assure
human access to space, could only be answered by a needs-based approach. Finally,
by taking a parametric look at the transportation needs as a function of the major
space activities, the study approach was able to accommodate the large uncertainty
in the space agenda that the nation might eventually embark upon. Figure 2.1.1-1
illustrates how eight potential mission types, based on the best understanding of
current and proposed missions, were assembled into five levels of space activity to
comprise the components of the parametric transportation needs model. This is the
HTS "mission model." Refer to Part HI, Section 5.1 for additional information.
2.1.2 Task 2: Customer-Desired Transportation Attributes
Attributes reflect what the customer considers important in the next human
transportation system. These attributes are determined by placing ourselves in the
customer's shoes, and asking what factors would be considered in the decision-
making process. These attributes are typically related to cost, safety, reliability, risk,
etc. To be useful in a rigorous study, the definitions and measurements of these
attributes had to be precisely established. Also, to quantitatively define the
contribution of each individual attribute to the customer, utility functions,
describing how important the value of each attribute was to the customer, were
defined. See Part II, Section 5.2.
The customer for the next human transportation system was determined to be that
individual most responsible for (a) ensuring that the transportation needs are
accomplished, (b) resolving what the total (human-tended and untended)
transportation architecture should be, (c) determining how that architecture is
implemented and operated, and (d) deciding how the total architecture is funded. It
was the consensus of the study team that the NASA Administrator best fit this
description.
2.1.3 Task 3: Architecture Evaluation
The results from Tasks 1 and 2 were used as inputs for Task 3. The ultimate
objective of this task was to develop the system-level requirements on any indicated
next transportation system. This was accomplished by first addressing the inevitable
architectural considerations concerning how the next human transportation system
relates to the other existing and planned programs which now provide some degree
of the transportation function. The requirements that resulted from this task
address the need and urgency for any next system(s), and provide "marks" for the
safety, reliability, cost, etc. values that the next system should possess to be
architecturally competitive. Addressing these requirements was best accomplished
by defining a list of considerations to be investigated.
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These considerations included:
• the degree of separation of people and cargo.
• the role of any new transportation system in relation to that of the Space Shuttle.
• assessing the cost-to-benefit of alternate access, that is having two methods to
deliver and/or return people and cargo.
• commonality with or influence on the Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV).
• the evolution of current systems.
• the s_e and features of an expendable booster developed specifically from the
outset with manned transportation in mind.
• the benefit that could be realized by using transportation systems employing
advanced technology approaches.
To address these considerations, a set of approximately 20 architectures was
constructed. An architecture is that set of transportation systems that accomplishes
the transportation needs over some specified time frame. To be unique, an
architecture must include the introduction dates of new systems and retirement
dates of old systems, numbers of expendable vehicles, fleet size for reusable vehicles,
and the supporting ground infrastructure supporting the flight systems. Evaluation
of the attribute values for these architectures as they perform the different levels of
space activity provides valuable target values for future systems to achieve if they
are to accomplish improvements over the current systems they are replacing.
2.1.4 • Task 4: New Ways of Doing Business Better
" 5:
The way transportation system elements are procured, managed, designed, and
operated has a significant bearing on their ability to provide routine, affordable,
reliable, and safe transportation. •The objective of this task was to identify any new
ways of doing the future transportation business that would result in more
favorable values of the transportation attributes. Most of the effort associated with
this task was directed at reducing the costs of ownership. The ultimate intent of this
activity was to identify current barriers to lower ownership costs so that
•management could develop subsequent plans for their removal and so that the
most significant of these findings could be implemented at the conclusion of the
study. The data from this activity was developed by interviewing top program and
project managers within industry and government, who were requested to provide
their insight into those organization, management, policy and procedures, and
funding and budget practices that, if done differently, would result in the largest
improvement in transportation system costs.
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The principal considerations assessed in the study were:
Separation of people and cargo. This consideration addressed whether it is better
to physically separate people and cargo onto different launch vehicles if the
people and cargo have a common destination. There is a perception that crew
safety or other factors can be enhanced through this separation. In other words,
what impact does carrying cargo have on crew safety and mission success?
@
Alternate access. This consideration addressed the impact of having an
alternative way to deliver and return both people and cargo. The principal
advantage of having alternate access is that there is a greater probability that a
required mission or payload can be accomplished. The principal disadvantage is
the cost of simultaneously operating multiple systems to do the same job. Note
that the term "assured access" is not used, since it was felt early-on by the study
team that there was no way to assure access or to measure whether, through
systems design, it could be achieved.
Commonality with or influence on the ACRV. This addressed the impact of
either having an ACRV and its effect on the resultant system choices that would
be made in a transportation architecture, or identifying whether other systems
could perform the emergency crew return function instead of a separate ACRV
vehicle.
Which booster to use for human launch applicatiow. This addressed the
relative advantages and disadvantages of using a new versus an existing
expendable launch vehicle for delivery of astronaut crews to low Earth orbit
(LEO).
Role of advanced technoloffv (new concepts). This consideration addressed the
degree to which new or adv_aced technology enhanced the cost, safety, etc. of a
transportation architecture. For this study, this included only new technology
systems, rather than technology advances at the subsystem or component level.
Evolution of current systema. This addressed the relative advantages and
disadvantages of evolving the current mixed fleet of launch vehicles, compared
with development of completely new systems.
Effect of return cargo requirement. This consideration quantified the impact of
return cargo requirements on the transportation architecture. Having a return
cargo requirement is a principal systems consideration in an architecture, as it
requires a distinct vehicle (either expendable or reusable) to return a payload. In
most cases, this would preclude delivery of the payload on an expendable launch
vehicle (ELV).
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Other considerations were not addressed in this study. Although these other
considerations may be important in and of themselves, they were judged by the
study team tO be of lesser importance, or significantly more difficult to quantify,
compared with the above considerations. Also, since the team believed that it
would encounter resource limitations and difficulty in getting valid data to make
comparisons of options which would address these considerations, it decided to
defer an assessment of these for this study. However, the team felt that all of these
warranted additional study. These are summarized below:
Influence of total Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) transportation requirements.
Because transportation requirements for SEI would be of such a magnitude
greater than Earth-to-orbit (ETO) requirements, and given the uncertainty of
these requirements, the study team chose only to include the impact of crew
delivery to support SEI missions on the ETO transportation systems.
Use of foreign assets. This would address the use of non-U.S, transportation
assets for delivery or return of people or cargo. Though the study team felt this
was an important consideration, it was not able to get the pertinent data (launch
vehicle cost, reliability, etc.) from foreign sources within the required study time
frame.
Reusable versus expendable personnel carriers. This referred specifically to the
trade of reusable versus expendable personnel launch system (PLS) concepts.
This was deemed to be a trade-study to be done at a level lower than the
architecture-level focus of this study.
The extent of evolution for the Space Shuttle. This addressed the idea that,
given that evolution is the "right" answer, what level of evolution makes the
most sense. Again, this was deemed to be a trade-study to be done at a level
lower than the architecture-level focus of this study.
The degree to which technology should be "pushed" to meet an early need. This
would explore the relationship between funding and technology readiness, i.e., if
a certain technology was required, what level of near-term expenditures would
be required to meet a specific program schedule. The study team felt it did not
have sufficient information to assess this effect.
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2.3 GROUNDRULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
We examined the existing constraints or groundrules which would limit the scope
of an architecture study. These extremely top-level requirements or groundrules,
called "stone tablet" requirements, are not tradeable and must be met by all
architectures without exception. These requirements were developed by the NIT
consensus, and represent the best estimation of what types of groundrules would be
considered inviolate by senior agency management. Some are based less on
engineering trade studies than on perception or policy. One way to see these
requirements is to think of the customer asking the following question: "I don't care
what the architecture looks like, as long as it does the following: ".
Section 2.3.1 contains the groundrules (or "stone tablets") the study adhered to,
while section 2.3.2 contains those which were rejected. The reader should refer to
the final report for the rationale behind imposing or rejecting these requirements.
2.3.1 HTS Stone Tablet Requirement8
• There can be no reliance on foreign countries to develop elements.
• SSF will be assembled with the Space Shuttle up to permanently manned
capability (PMC).
• The SSF design through PMC is fixed.
• The operational requirements, procedures, and constraints of the SSF and other
on-orbit assets are fixed.
• Mixed fleet manifest will be used to define the architecture through 1996.
• No international treaties will be violated.
2.3.2 Rejected Stone Tablet Requirements_ Here are the most important "stone
tablets" which were rejected by the study team. Refer to the final report for the
complete list with supporting rationale.
• Must be consistent with National Launch Policy.
• Must ensure dual access.
• New ways of doing business must be included in candidate architectures.
• New elements must advance the state-of-the-art.
• Reliability is greater than X.
• Dependability of 95 percent within 2 weeks of scheduled launch.
• All systems must be at least as safe as Y.
• Total Life Cycle Cost is less than Z.
• Abort must be provided for in all flight phases.
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SECTION 3
I-ITS FINDINGS: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
3.1 DETAILED FINDINGS BY ARCHITECTURE PATH
The significant findings relevant to pursuing each of the possible architectural paths
are provided below. This information is provided to aid agency planners in
determining how best to meet the nation's transportation needs. These results are
also useful in understanding the potential consequences that may likely result along
a potential path, should they choose not to use attributes and their associated
priorities in determining which path to follow. In other words, it quantifies the
impact of a customer's decision. Of course, all findings, conclusions, and
recommendations are based on the assumptions, methodologies, and data presented
in this report. When findings lead to recommendations that can be substantiated by
the data, they are cited in section 4.0 of this summary.
As a result of the HTS study, the NIT has developed the following findings and
consequences that would be encountered as a function of the chosen path. Unless
otherwise noted, findings apply to the "If" C mission model activity level (continue
current missions plus SSF PMC) over the time frame 1992-2020. Note that the study
findings are a strong function of the activity level. Similar findings for the "If" B
mission activity level (current missions only), as well as the other activity levels,
can be obtained from the summary tables in Part Ill. Refer to section 5 for an
explanation of the systems and architectures described below.
Other than the single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) concept used in this study (see Part 1II),
the current transportation systems (Space Shuttle, Delta, Atlas, Titan) have the
lowest total architecture cost (integrated annual experiditures from the present to
2020) based on current ways of doing business. All other Space Shuttle replacement
architectures add at least 30 percent to transportation costs over this study time
period. This finding applies if we engage in transportation activity levels greater
than or equal to assembly and support of SSF (IFC). For less aggressive
transportation models, some architectures become cost competitive with the current
systems.
If we retain current systems, then the HTS process indicates that:.
New Space Shuttle Orbiters are likely to be needed for future demand and/or
probable losses, since the flight demand is driven by SSF deployment and
support, and other transport.
• An additional mobile launch platform (MLP) is the only Space Shuttle facility
element needed to support this implementation.
• The HTS needs model cannot be supported with the eight flight-per-year
restriction on the Space Shuttle.
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If we evolve current systems, then the HTS process indicates that:
a. For the baseline Space Shuttle evolution compared with current systems
• Total architecture cost increased by $ 20B to $ 27B, with a $ 3B higher peak
funding requirement and a $ 3B to $ 4B higher unreliability cost.
• Crew loss events are reduced 12 to 34 percent.
• Architecture risk increases 12 to 16 percent, inversely with activity level.
• Piloted flights decrease by 0 to 90 from 'If" A through "If" E-High due to the
introduction of the •reusable cargo vehicle (RCV) and increased Space
Shuttle performance.
• Unpiloted flights increase by 0 to 97 from "If" A through "If" E-High due to
the introduction of the RCV.
• Mission success is not significantly affected.
Environmental impact is reduced 12 to 33 percent for "If's" A through
E-High due to Space Shuttle liquid rocket boosters.
• Additional Space Shuttle facility elements are not required.
bo
Additional Space Shuttle Orbiters are likely to be needed for future demand
and/or probable losses.
For evolution including Hybrid Rocket Boosters and Crew Escape Modules
(CEM's) compared with current systems
Piloted flights decrease by 45 with respect to current systems and increase by
11 with respect to baseline evolution due to the introduction of the RCV,
and the decreased Space Shuttle performance due to the addition of a CEM.
• Unpiloted flights increase by 83 with respect to current systems due to the
introduction of the RCV.
• Mission success is not significantly affected.
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Total architecture cost increased by $ 47.1B over the current systems and by $
14.8B over the baseline evolution case. In addition, the peak funding
requirement was $ 6.3B higher than the current systems and $2.2B higher
than the baseline evolution case. Unreliability costs were increased $6.3B
over current systems and $ 2.2B over the baseline evolution case.
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Crew loss events are reduced by 39 percent with respect to current systems
and 15 percent with respect to baseline evolution. The CEM's contributed
less than 0.7 of 2.6 crew loss reductions. The remaining reductions were
primarily due to fewer human flights through use of the RCV.
Cost risk increases 13 percent with respect to current systems and 0.5 percent
with respect to evolution architectures.
Environmental impact is decreased 25 percent with respect to current
systems and increased 1 percent with respect to baseline evolution.
One more Orbiter/RCV is required for demand and also attrition with
respect to current systems.
• A newSpace Shuttle MLP is not required.
If we replace current systems with new systems, then the HTS process indicates that:.
Significant improvements in safety can be achieved by several alternative
transportation architectures. This is due to the addition of features such as
vehicle hold-down on the pad, engine-out capability, abort capability during
all ascent phases, and careful selection of the major propulsive systems. The
additional cost to achieve this added safety ranges from $ 40B to $ 60B for
additional development and operations costs for Architectures 5 and 6
respectively. Refer to Part II, section 5.3 for a description of these
architectures.
If we augment the current systems with new systems, then the HTS process
indicates that:.
Total architecture cost increased by $ 55.6B to $ 94.9B, with a $ 2.5B to $9.6B
higher peak funding requirement and a -$ 6.4B to + $1.5B change in
unreliability cost.
• Crew loss events vary from -48 percent to +7.5 percent.
• Architecture risk increases 15 percent to 40 percent.
• Piloted flights vary by -61 to +70 for "If' C through "If' E-High.
• Unpiloted flights increase by 68 to 222 for "If' C through "If" E-High.
• Mission success does not vary significantly.
• Environmental impact varies from -21 percent to +10 percent.
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3.2 RESPONSES TO VIEWPOINTS
Prior to the HTS study, there were several inconsistent viewpoints common among
discussions concerning the need for a new transportation system. These viewpoints
usually began with a statement born out of some frustration with the Space Shuttle,
and were followed by some expression of desire for a replacement system. Too
often, however, these viewpoints were contradictory and provided no useful
direction for agency planners. We believe itisimportant to spedficaUy respond to
these viewpoints, since they impact discussions of whether or how new systems can
or should be justified.
As a result of having evaluated the data relative to these questions during the
course of this study, and the extreme emphasis put on definition and measurement
specifics during the FITS study, the NIT can provide their insightful responses to
these conflicting viewpoints.
• '"The nation should not buy a new Orbiter OR the nation should continue to rely
on the Space Shuttle for the next 20 to 30 years."
Without taking attrition into account, the current fleet does not support
transportation requirements which would continue current missions and
subsequently add SSF build-up and support ("IS' Scenario C), if it is necessary to
fly the payloads in the year in which they are currently planned. However, the
current fleet can support these requirements with an additional Space Shuttle
Orbiter and an MLP. The bottom line is: the decision on the number of required
orbiters in the future must be based both on potential attrition and the expected
usage rate required to meet future demand.
• "The Space Shuttle costs too much to operate."
This viewpoint incorrectly assumes that operations costs (only) are the dominant
attribute the agency is trying to minimize, when in fact, minimizing the agency's
annual expenditure on transportation is the objective we are trying to achieve.
A decision made on only one component of cost (Design, Development, Test,
and Evaluation - DDT&E, operations, or production of components) which
comprises an annual expenditure will almost certainly be a bad one.
• 'WVe need alternate access to space in the event of an extended Space Shuttle
downtime."
To provide alternate access for people and cargo, the nation should be prepared
to spend an additional $ 50B to $100B between now and 2020 to develop, operate,
and maintain this capability. The range depends upon whether alternate access
is provided for cargo-up only, cargo-up and -down, or People-and cargo-up and
-down. The sheer expense of providing alternate access dictates that we develop
a strategy for minimizing non-technical reasons to Space Shuttle downtime.
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"We should separate people from cargo in the name of safety."
The presence of some cargo capability on the human-tended carrier was not
found to have a deleterious impact on the number of crew losses that could be
expected.
"We should separate people from cargo in the name of cost."
The presence of some cargo on a personnel carrier can be cost advantageous
when crew and cargo are being delivered to the same destination. This is
especially true of vehicles with higher cargo capacity, given that the support of
SSF comprises the majority of our transportation activity.
As a replacement for existing systems, new systems currently under study which
either combine or separate people from cargo are still more expensive than
continued use of current systems.
"New systems based upon newer technology promise significant improvements,
and therefore we need to develop new systems."
The SSTO, with its reliance on more advanced technology relative to many of
the other options studied, would be a cost effective alternative to the Space
Shuttle were it to actually achieve its stated cost goals. However, the low
confidence level in the cost data provided puts this finding in question.
'_I_ere should be commonality between the ACRV and the next HTS."
Architecture level trades, such as the HTS study, do not possess the fidelity
required to evaluate this point. From a total architecture standpoint, whether a
new personnel carrier should also double as the ACRV or not is a secondary
concern, due to the relatively low cost and usage rate of the ACRV, and not a
primary factor in determining the transportation system. Once that basic
decision is made, assessing commonality with the ACRV would be in order.
"Air launch systems promise significant attribute improvements for any new
transportation system."
Candidate air-launched systems evaluated in this study did not fare well due to
the small cargo levels and the resulting high flight rates associated with them.
Life cycle architecture costs were still dominated by the cost of ELV's to fly heavy
payloads.
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SECTION 4
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMFNDATIONS
b.
C.
do
4.1 CONCLUSIONS
From the extensive work performed in this study, the NIT has gained a unique
insight into the quality and consistency of work performed by both industry and
government on candidate transportation systems. From this unique vantage point,
the NIT concludes the following:
a. Many of the systems defined in the study have sufficient definition so that
vehicles in their class can be evaluated and specific systems down-selected
without further study at the architecture level. (Of course, once the architectural
path is selected, there would be additional system definition required.)
"Sufficient definition" is defined here as either (a) having enough level of detail
in an absolute sense, or (b) improving the system definition beyond the current
point is not warranted since architecture considerations dominate. Those
concepts having sufficient definition at this time are:
• Manned Launch System (New Launch System (NLS))
• Space Shuttle/Shuttle Evolution
• Beta II
• Advanced Military Spaceflight Capability
• Crew and logistics vehicle
• Titan (including human-rated versions)
• personnel-only carriers (e.g., PLS, reuseable ultralight personnel carrier, etc.)
Further system concept definition is required on the following concepts before
they can be evaluated for their suitability in a future personnel transportation
system.
• SSTO
• National Aerospace Plane (NASP)-derived vehicles
• advanced two-stage-to-orbit concepts (e.g., advanced manned launch system(AMLS))
• air-launched concepts
Sufficient definition of potential new ways of doing business exists, and it is
now time to quantify and verify these new business practices on the existing
systems.
Providing alternate access by developing new dedicated U.S. assets is not cost
effective.
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Significant improvements in crew safety were realized through the introduction
of launch escape, engine-out, and holddown on new systems.
There is no inherent safety benefit from separating crew and cargo. (This does
not mean that untended payloads should be placed aboard human-tended
vehicles. It means that if the crew will be working with the payload while in
orbit, having both delivered on the same launch vehicle, in and of itself, does
not adversely impact safety.)
")ii
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
The intent of the HTS study was to provide the information necessary for senior
agency management to make a determination on the path to follow for the next
HTS, and not to recommend the specific architecture. To reach recommendations
on the transportation system for the future, the HTS study process requires
prioritization of desired transportation attributes by the NASA administrator. Since
he or she is the ultimate transportation customer and the executive branch's
steward of the nation's space program, any recommendations are a direct function
of his attributes and their relative priority. As a result, while the study did compare
architecture options based on the team's assessment of missions and attributes, the
study team is not able to recommend a preferred or optimal transportation
architecture, or any specific concepts which are a part of them, at this time.
However, the I-ITS study process provides a very valuable tool to aid the
administrator's evaluation of options for the next transportation system once his or
her requirements are known.
There are however, recommendations that can be made as a direct result of the
experience gained during this study. They are:
ao Development of Mission Requirements and Evaluation Criteria. Prior to
deciding what the next transportation system should be, focus senior agency
management on customer-desired attributes, their measurements, and mission
requirements for new systems, rather than on system or vehicle concepts.
Acceptance of this recommendation will allow convergence more quickly on
the desired transportation system. For a national program, space program
managers, the Department of Defense (DOD), and other potential users should
be included in the working group to define desired attributes and their
measurements.
b° New Ways of Doing Business. Implement a plan for instituting new business
practices immediately on existing systems. The plan should be constructed so
that any actual savings realized should be "banked" first for verification
accounting and confirmation purposes, before using the savings to pay for new
programs.
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CEM's on Space Shuttle. Do not pursue retrofit of a crew escape module on the
existing Space Shuttle fleet due to the high cost and small improvement in
safety.
Human Tended versus Untended Transportation. Consider both the human-
tended and untended aspects of transportation simultaneously (at the
architecture level) when considering what the next human transportation
system should be.
Separation of People and Cargo. Do not pursue development of a transportation
system which separates people from cargo in the name of increased safety.
Architectural considerations (i.e., additional flight rates) and other
transportation requirements were found to contribute most to safety. Since the
HTS study found that the presence of cargo capability with the human-tended
vehicle has little effect on safety, and that other architectural considerations
dominate, the amount of cargo capability in any next human transportation
system should be predominantly driven by providing the transportation needs
in an effective manner.
New Personnel Vehicles Derived from an ACRV. The decision on any future
transportation system should not be based on whether the ACRV function
should be common with the primary transportation function. Once the overall
transportation architecture decision has been made, the decision as to whether
an ACRV is even required, or whether its function should be provided by the
basic transportation capability, would be determined by whether it produced a
favorable impact on the primary attributes.
Areas of additional study. Redefine new technology programs in a way that will
support a go/no-go commitment for these approaches within a total
transportation architectural context. While new technology solutions such as
SSTO appear advantageous, the fidelity of the cost and technical data does not
currently allow commitment to this alternative. For example, the SSTO
requires further definition in ground processing turnaround to validate the
costs relative to other transportation alternatives that have much better cost
definition. (The HTS study results indicate that the total SSTO program costs:
DDT&E, production, and operations, would have to increase by a factor of only
2.3 to negate any cost advantage over the Space Shuttle.) Redefining the early
SSTO definition activities to obtain that data for comparison on an equal
architectural basis would foster an early decision from among the transportation
alternatives. This also holds true for NASP-derived vehicles, AMLS, and air-
launched concepts with significant cargo capacity.
ii= •
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PART II
PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY
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SECTION 5
STUDY RESULTS
5.1 I-rrs MISSION MODEL
The needs model for the study was based on the NASA Mixed Fleet Manifest and the
Civil Needs Data Base (CNDB) FY90 version with Space Station Restructure
modifications and a "strawman" DOD mission model. All delivery and return masses
identified were for the payload only and did not include the launch vehicle. Also not
included were upper stage weights for those payloads going beyond LEO or required
support equipment.
An analysis was performed to identify the number, mass, type, and destination of
human-tended and untended payloads to space. The payloads were then broken into
several categories based on a common mission or theme. Some of these mission types
were easily defined as they were presented within the CNDB (e.g., ISF). Others were
defined from different sources or were created and extracted from the CNDB (e.g.,
Sortie ,Science). All mission payload crew sizes were four persons, although extra
persons might be required to support and operate the personnel vehicle.
(
:
I-ITS MISSION TYPES
The payloads in the FY90 CNDB and the subsequent HTS Needs Model were divided
into eight mission types or groups of activity that had similar characteristics. These
mission types are described below:
DOD
This category indudes human-tended and untended DOD missions. The untended
data for this category was obtained from the MSFC Space Transportation Infrastructure
Study and is expressed in terms of vehicle dass launch rates, rather than specific
missions or payloads. This is a capability-based (number of expected flights) model due
to the classified nature of the needs.
To select the DOD human mission requirement, we noted that of the 45 Space Shuttle
flights since 1981, 10 have been dedicated to DOD, an average of about I per year. In
the NASA Mixed Fleet Manifest, there is an additional flight in 1992, with no additional
flights forecasted or manifested after this. Based on this information, we recommend a
human requirement for DOD of one mission per year. It is also assumed the DOD
mission will require some cargo, but not necessarily on the same flight or vehide. This
is a reduction from the Next Manned Transportation System Study in 1989 which
identified a human mission requirement for future DOD missions of three flights per
year.
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Base
This category is comprised of basic science and technology development payloads
which have low return requirements. Example payloads are the Gamma Ray
Observatory, the Earth Observing System, Cassini, and CRRES. All payloads in this
category have a return requirement of less than 1000 lbs. It should not be confused with
the CNDB Base Model.
Supports Assets
This category constitutes high-priority, space-based infrastructure satellites for
communications, tracking, and data relay. The nine payloads in this mission type
reflect operational versus scientific or developmental systems, and would have a very
high launch priority compared to other science or exploration missions. Example
payloads are TDRS, GOES, and INMARSAT. There are no human requirements in this
category, although a few of these payloads will be carried aboard the Space Shuttle.
Industrial Space Facility (ISF)
This category includes those payloads which comprise the ISF. For the HTS study, a
reduced-scale ISF payload model was used based partially on recommendations from
the MSFC Space Transportation Infrastructure Study. All payloads in this mission type
have a common destination.
Sortie Science
This category includes larger, "Spacelab-type" missionswhich have return
requirements greater than 1000 pounds. Example payloads are Space Life Sciences,
ASTRO, and International Microgravity Laboratory. Payloads in this mission type
strongly reflect the Shuttle-based transportation architecture.
i "_ i !
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Satellite Servicing
This category includes satellite servicing missions for repair, reboost, maintenance,
retrieval, and upgrade of LEO systems. It does not include servicing missions for SSF or
SEI.
Space Station Freedom (SSF)
This category includes those payloads which comprise the SSF. This includes assembly,
utilization,logistics,crew rotation,and expansion flightsbased on the latestSSF design
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configuration restructure. However, the actual payloads were the same as those of the
FY90 version of the CNDB.
The SSF mission type was further broken down into a PMC model which included
assembly, operations, and support of the Permanently Manned Configuration and an
expansion model which included any non-SEI expansion to the PMC configuration (e.g.,
Expanded Crew Capability). All payloads in the SSF mission type have a common
destination.
Even though the restructure activity will greatly impact non-core SSF related payloads,
developing a new payload model with a reasonable degree of confidence would have
been very difficult for this study. Since these payloads represented only a fraction of the
core station weight, it was assumed that the overall mass of these payloads would not
change significantly from the FY90 CNDB. This assumption must be revisited, since it
is likely that after the restructure, payload requirements far exceed available capability.
Therefore, data for all non-core SSF related payloads came from the FY90 CNDB.
However, all first flights for the payloads were shifted later by 2 years to reflect the
changes in the station design due to restructure.
• Crew Rotation Assumptions
Since no official SSF crew rotation policy exists, the following assumptions were made
for the study:
The entire four-person crew during the PMC phase will be rotated every 90 days.
(After some certification, the crew would probably be rotated every other flight
for longer duration tours of duty.) This establishes the number of flights
required to support SSF crew rotation.
- During an eight-crew phase, only four persons can be rotated during a human
flight. This implies a 180-day tour of duty.
- All Space Shuttle flights to the Space Station have a crew of seven. Other
personnel vehicles have crew sizes ranging from four to seven.
! !ii ¸ :
Space Exploration Initiative
The model for SEI in the HTS study is based on a high and low traffic requirement for
crew to LEO to support human missions to the Moon and Mars. This requirement was
established based on recommendations of possible SEI activity levels from the NASA
90-day Study and the Synthesis Group report. The manifesting considered only
delivery missions, since it was assumed crew return would be handled by direct return
or rendezvous with SSF. Lunar and Mars cargo requirements were not considered since
these requirements are still emerging and the proposed scope of activities would mean
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large differences in the payload requirements. Also, since it is likely that a heavy-lift
launch vehicle will be required and that this vehicle would be oversized for crew
transportation requirements, there would be little synergism between this vehicle and
one required for transporting crew to LEO. This assumption will be revisited in future
studies.
I-ITS AC'I1VI'_ SCENARIOS
Finally, the eight mission types were combined into five levels of possible future space
activity (see Figure 2.1.1-1). These levels are called "If Scenarios", i.e., "If the range of
expected space activity includes..." These levels are additive and represent increasing
levels of requirements, not only in terms of payload to and from space but also
additional vehicle capabilities (Remote Manipulator Systems, on-orbit stay times, etc.)
Dividing proposed space activity into different levels gives the customer insight into the
effect of various payload requirements on the space transportation architecture.
• ,!)i
5.1-4 Rev. A
5.2 ATTRIBUTE D_ON AND MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE DF,SCRIFUONS
Attributes are the means with which an architecture's goodness is determined so that it
may be compared with other architecture options. To be useful in comparison, an
attribute must be definable and be measurable. The measurements must also be
repeatable, which in turn means that the calculations are well understood and the
assumptions are clear and used c0nsistenfly across each architecture. In addition, we
felt that it was less important to determine an absolute value for a given attribute than
to use a consistent methodology which would yield values for a relative comparison of
architectures.
The attributes defined in detail for this study include: Funding Profile, Probability of
Mission Success (PMS), Safety, Architecture Cost Risk, Launch Schedule Confidence,
and Environment. Each of these is summarized below, along with a definition and
description of the measurement technique used. These were derived from a list of
nearly 130 attributes that were initially proposed by the I-ITS team. Certain techniques
used in a quality function deployment process were used to arrive at consensus on the
final list. Additional analyses, such as payload manifesting and ground operations
assessments, which were required to deternxine architecture-level values, are described
in the final report.
5.2.1 Funding Profile
Definition
The Funding Profile attribute is comprised of two subattributes, Total Architecture Cost
(TAC) and Peak Year Funding (PYF), and is the sum of the system costs of an architec-
ture, by year, incurred over the time period of study interest (1992-2020), to deliver all
missions flown from 1998 through 2020. The costs per year include the non-recurring
and recurring element and system costs associated with providing the capability to
satisfy the mission model, as defined in the particular "If" scenario of interest. The TAC
is the total architecture cost over the life of the study, including the cost of vehicle losses
due to unreliability. The PYF is the dollar amount in the year of peak (maximum) costs.
All the costs were estimated in constant 1992 dollars.
Measurement of the Attribute
The following describes the methodology to develop the cost data used in determining
the funding profile for each architecture.
/_i _/,
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Cost Analysis Data Flow.
The cost analysis was carried out as an integrated process, requiring key inputs be
supplied by each of several different NIT groups which were developing and
measuring different architecture attributes. Resulting architecture cost estimates were
passed to the Architecture Evaluation Tool (AET) for fin_ processing and inclusion in
the overall architecture scoring process. Figure 5.2.1-1 outlines this data flow.
Operations Lead
• Reusable Hardware
and Facility
Requirements by year
• Unscheduled
Maintenance
System Data
Gatherin_
• System Definition
Sheets
• System Cost Data
Input Sheets
Manifesting Lead
• Yearly flight rates
by system
Prob Mission
Success and
Safety Leads
• System reliability
F percentage• Probability
catastrophic
loss-manned
vehicle
iiii _ii__.
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I AET
• Wraps • Escalate,Discount (Optional)
• Scoring • Cost Reports
Figure 5.2.1-1.- Funding profile cost analysis data flow.
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Cost input data for each system included the non-recurring costs for DDT&E and
facilities, as well as flight-rate-sensitive recurring production and operations cost inputs
in the form of Theoretical First Unit plus learning and rate curves, and/or fixed per year
and variable per flight costs. In addition, year-by-year spread factors for each cost
element, to reflect the year in which costs were incurred, were provided. Figure 5.2.1-2
illustrates the general input-process-output connections within the cost model.
Cost Analysis Definitions.
The following define the costs used in determining the Funding Profile Attribute.
(a) The TAC of an architecture includes the total cost of all transportation systems in
the architecture, where total system TAC is the sum of Non-recurring, Recurring,
and Transportation System Failure costs as defined below.
(b) The TAC for each architecture indudes the following phases of the system's life
cycle:
Non-Recurring -
Recurring-
DDT&E
Non-Recurring Production
Facilities
Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3D
Recurring Production
Operations
Transportation System Failures (unreliability)
Refer to the final report for additional breakdown of these cost categories.
//ii ,_
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Figure 5.2.1-2.- Architecture cost modeling process.
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Cost Analysis Groundrules And Assumptions.
• All costs are reported in constant 1992 dollars.
The TAC assessment time horizon for all architectures is 1992 through 2020,
considering the non-recurring and recurring cost to support all missions flown from
1998 through 2020. The costs for missions flown from 1992 through 1997 are no__At
considered part of TAC.
Cost wraps: Program wrap factors for contractor fee, government support and
reserves, and contingency, were consistently applied to all systems. Baseline wrap
factors, obtained from NASA Headquarters Code B, are shown in Table 5.2.1-1.
TABLE 5.2.1-1.- I-ITS STUDY COST WRAP FACTORS
_ement
Fee •
Program Support *_
Reserves **_
HQ Taxes ****
Combined Total Wrap Factor
Notes:
#
Non-Recurring
Costs
10%
20%
35%
2%
80.4%
Recurring Costs
10%
10%/15% #
2O%
2%
47.4%/54.0% #
Percentage shown is of Prime Cost.
Percentage shown is of Total Prime Cost with Fee. Includes management and
integration.
Percentage shown is of Total Prime Cost with Fee + Program Support.
Percentage shown is of Total Prime Cost with Fee.
With No Primary Engines/With Primary Engines
i J :
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5.2.2
Definition
For the purposes of this study, the NIT consensus definition of safety is the measure of
risk in terms of human loss caused by the elements and/or operations associated with a
given architecture. Human loss is the death or incapacitating injury of flight personnel.
No attempt was made to determine loss of the general populace as would be associated
with a catastrophic event involving a major population center. This definition is meant
to exclude the impact on property.
Measurement of the Attribute
The inclusion of safety as a comparative system attribute was based on the perception
that adequately providing for the well being of humans associated with space flight
endeavors has been and will remain an important consideration to the customer (as well
as the general public). The approach taken to compare 'safety' was to calculate a risk
index for each proposed element. Each architecture, in turn, would sum the risk indices
for the elements it uses to arrive at a total probable number of flight personnel losses
over the length of the architecture.
Inflight emergencies can be caused by any number of failures and often involve
complex system interactions involving secondary and tertiary effects. Some of these
emergencies will require contingency procedures (possibly including abor0 if the crew
is to remain safe. Because it was deemed impractical to model all the possible failure
modes and effects, six major groupings of typical failures were evaluated for each flight
phase for each system. These categories are meant to define the primary_ cause of the
flight emergency. The six failure categories considered in this study are:
Explosion
Fire
Loss of Control,
Damaged Vehicle
Benign Failure
Hazardous Environment
The method used to calculate risk involves a high-level reliability assessment and a
statistical (or postulated in new systems) grouping of the major types and effects of
failures. The reliability assessment uses the output from the PMS attribute; that is, a
reliability value for each distinct and significant flight phase. When a failure event
occurs, there is a chance that the crew can survive the short term effects immediately
attributable to the failure condition. This Probability of Survival (Ps) is determined for
each of six major failure categories by historical analogy and assessment by a group of
safety experts. Subsequently, for the cases where the crew has survived the failure, it is
assumed some abort or contingency procedures would be initiated. Depending on the
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system design, flight regime, and the nature of the failure, there will be some
probability of a successful abort, defined as up to the point where the crew has arrived
on land aliveand with no incapacitating injuries. This Probability of Abort (PA) is also
determined for each of six major failure categories by historical analogy and assessment
by a group of safety experts. The study team determined from a quick analysis that the
risk to the crew in the on-orbit and descent phases of flight were much less than that
experienced during ascent and, therefore, the ascent portion of the flight only was
examined for this attribute.
To determine the probability of a loss event then, the probabilities of unsuccessfully
surviving and aborting are multiplied together with the relative percentage of
occurrence (F, in %) of the major failure category (a forced distribution) and then
summed to produce a single risk index (called PD) for each flight phase.
Mathematically:
6
PD = 1-_ {(F/100)*(Ps)i*(PA)i}
i=1
where i is the failure category.
In the case of benign failures, the percentage F represents the balance of failure modes
not accounted for by the other five cases. An example of how a 'q_enign" failure can
effect safety is found in the case where an external tank (ET) fails to separate from the
Shuttle Orbiter. There would be no immediate impact to the mission or to the safety of
the crew; however, some contingency procedure will need to be executed to
successfully reenter the Orbiter, and that procedure may not be wholly successful,
resulting in crew loss.
Figure 5.2.2-1 is an example worksheet of how the PD value is derived. Another way to
look at the value of PD is to use it as a ratio of loss events over the total failure events.
The values for PD are, in general, conservative; however, since all the elements were
developed with the same thinking and the same experts, the relative comparison should
be valid.
_ii _
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Element: FIR Titan IV / PLS
Flight
Phase:
Emergency
Explosion
Fire
Loss of Control
Damaged
Vehicle
Benign Failure
Hazardous
Environment
Sta_e I (Core) •I_nition
Probable Cause
I_opellan t leak, turbopump
failure
Propellant leak, APU, fuel
cells
Actuator failure, GN&C
failure
Shock interactions, transient
loads
Software, failure of non-
critical system
ECLSS failure, leak in
pressure shell
% of
Failures
19
15
2O
4O
P
Survivable
0.5
0.3
0.07
O5
0.9
0.97
P
Abort
0_
0.7
0.6
0_
0.97
0.9
100
PD --- 0.1311
Figure 5.2.2-1.- Example safety worksheet.
For the entire mission, then, the PD by phase is multiplied by the value of unreliability
of that phase, and multiplied across all phases to arrive at a net Probability of Loss (PL)
defined as:
k
PL = 1- lr { PMSj + (1- PDj) * ( 1- PMSj) }
j=l
where k is the total number of flight phases.
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The value of PD takes into account the duration of the flight phase (exposure to risk),
the flight environment (altitude, q, temperature, ambient pressure, etc.), and the abort
modes or contingencies available at that point in the mission profile. Thus a value of
PD of 0.05 is not simply ten times 'worse' than a value of 0.005; multiplication with
(1 - PMS) amounts to an adjustment based on the likelihood of failure.
Although the most significant safety comparisons are made at the architectural level
(multiple systems with variable flight rates), it is informative to examine the relative
loss rates of different human systems used in this study. Figure 5.2.2-2 depicts the
average number of flights between crew loss events for the ten human systems
examined. The figure below points out some major features related to safety that help
to understand the relative loss rates.
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Figure 5.2.2-2.- Relative loss rates for human systems.
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5.2.3 Probability of Mission Success (PMS)
Definition
The PMS is the number of successful missions divided by the total number of missions.
Successful missions are defined as delivering or accomplishing the jobs described in the
mission model, not necessarily returning the reusable hardware or flight crew safely.
Payload failures were not estimated or included in the measurement.
Measurement of the Attribute
Calculating the PMS begins with describing the phases of flight for each system and
constructing a system success tree. Equations are then defined to determine the
probability of success of each flight phase. The input values for each variable in the
equations are determined for each system and the final PMS is calculated. The
architecture value is obtained by flight rate averaging the value for each system and
then combining all of the system scores in that architecture.
System success trees.
The foundation for quantifying PMS is the system success tree. The tree developed for
the Space Shuttle (Figure 5.2.3-1) is used here to explain their development.
Initially, the mission profile was divided into three parts: ascent, orbit, and descent.
Each part was then subdivided into phases based on distinct flight events. These phases
represent distinct launch vehicle reliability and/or safety changes. For the Space
Shuttle, there are four different propulsive modes during ascent: Space Shuttle main
engine (SSME) ignition and thrust buildup (Phase 1), solid rocket booster (SRB) ignition
through burnout (Phase 2), SSME operation from SRB jettison through main engine cut-
off (MECO) (Phase 4), and orbit circularization (Phase 8). Two staging events, SRB
burnout and ET jettison, occur during ascent. SRB jettison (Phase 3) separates Phase 2
and 4. The ET is jettisoned (Phase 3) shortly after MECO. In addition, there is a coast
period (Phase 7) between ET jettison and orbit circularization.
_i __ ,i
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STS ASCENT SUCCESSTREE
U U
< OUTOFORBITERANDOFFPAD_ CATASTROPHIC N_30 TOSTSABORT REE
Y_ LO_OFChEW
PHASE DESCRIFFION COMMENTS
1 SSME IGNITION
2 SRB IGNITION
3 SSME/SRB BURN TIME
4 SRB SEPARATION
5 SSME BURN TIME
6 ET JE'ITISON
7 COAST
8 OMS CIRCULARIZATION
IGNITION AND THRUST BUILDUP
IGNITION AND LIFTOFF
PARALLEL BURN TIME TO SRB TALLOW
THROUGHMECO
INCLUDES IGNITION, BURN & CUTOFF.
/,
Figure 5.2.3-1.- Space Shuttle ascent success tree.
On-orbit and descent phases were common across all systems and, therefore, did not
contribute to mission success comparisons between systems. For this reason the ascent
phase was the only part of the mission that was modeled for reliability analysis.
Modeling system reliability.
A review of space launch attempts Shows that failures can be grouped into three major
categories: engine failures, propulsion system failures (tanks, lines, etc.) and other
failures (avionics, electronics, etc.). The equations used in this study account for the
number of engines, stages and their associated reliabilities. If a system has three
engines on one stage, the reliability is cubed. If a particular event (e.g., SSME burn)
occurs across several phases, the reliability for that functioning hardware is raised to a
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power of one over the number of phases in which it operates. A cumulative reliability
for a candidate system is the product of the reliability of each phase.
As an example, the following equations were developed for the first five phases of the
Space Shuttle ascent:
RS1
AR
RL
RSS
= Stage I Propulsion Hardware
= Avionics Reliability
= Liquid Engine Reliability
= Segmented Solids Reliability
Phase 1 - SSME ignition and thrust buildup
Rpl = RS11/4 * AR1/8 * (RL3)1/4
Phase 2 - SRB ignition
Rp2= RS11/4 * AR 1/8 * (RL3) 1/4 * (RSS2) 1/2
Phase 3 - SSME and SRB burn
Rp3= RS11/4 * AR 1/8 * (RL3) 1/4 * (RSS2) 1/2
Phase 4- SRB Separation
Rp4 = AR 1/8 * 0.9999
Phase 5 - SSME burn to cut-off
Rp5 = RSll/4 • AR1/8 * (RL3)1/4
: i_ :
// q
System Results
The final calculated PMS values for the systems used in this study are presented in
Table 5.2.3-1. It is important to note that the purpose of this analysis was to provide a
way of comparing relative reliabilities of different launch systems and not to develop a
point reliability value. In addition, since the avionics reliability value was a single
multiplier used on all systems and did not contribute any comparative information, it
was eliminated from the final score. The effect of eliminating the avionics reliability
was to increase the predicted system reliabilities by roughly two percent.
By using a single value based on all launch history since 1964 for a hardware type (such
as liquid engines), some existing individual launch vehicles have lower combined
reliabilities than their present launch history indicates. An example of this is the Titan
IV. If a PMS was calculated for this system according to its recent flight history it would
be 0.958. Using the study model yields a PMS for the Titan IV of 0.9307. This bias,
however, is applied across all systems and therefore does not detract from the validity
of its intended purpose as a tool for relative comparison.
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TABLE 5.2.3-1.- PMS RESULTS
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SYSTEM
AMSC
ATLAS IIAS
ATLAS EV
BETA II
DELTA
MLS-X (CIV)
MLS-X (RPC)
MLS-X (non SSF)
MLS-HL (NUS)
MLS-I-IL (C-IV)
MLS-HL (RPC/LRV,
CRV, CLV)
NL.S-20 (AUS)
NI_50 (CTV)
NI.S-50 (RPC)
NLS-50 (NUS)
N-LS-50 (AUS)
NLS-HL (CFV)
NLS-HL (CRV)
NLS-HL (AUS)
SSTO
Shuttle
Shuttle Evolution
RCV
TrI'AN II
HR TrrAN II (RUIK:)
TrrAN []
TITANev
TrrANev/CENT
TrrAN W (N-US)
nTAN IV (Centaur)
TrrAN IV (CIF/LRV)
FIR TrrAN W (RPC)
L - Liquid Engines
SS - Segmented Solids
MS - Monolithic Solids
PMS
.9577
..9326
.9369
.9652
.9319
.9455
.9544
.9842
.9691
.9455
.9543
.9435
.9455
.9544
.9842
.9455
.9308
.9308
.9308
.9691
.9431
.9290
.9290
,9626
.9323
.9307
.9519
.9166
.93O7
.9100
.9242
.9189
STAGES
2
3
3
2
3
3
3
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
1
3
3
3
3
2
2
4
4
2
3
3
2
4
3
4
3
5
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ENGINES
5
7L,4MS
5L,4MS
3
3L,10MS
10
12
6
9
11
12
5
10
12
6
10
8L,2SS
8L,2SS
8L_.SS
14
5L,2SS
13
13
3
7L,10MS
4L_S
5L_2SS
7L_SS
4L_S
7L_qS
7L_SS
18
Engine out?
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
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Y
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5.2.4 Architecture Cost Risk
Definition
The Architecture Cost Risk is the risk, or expression of uncertainty, in developing,
producing, and operating all systems in an architecture at their stated costs based upon
their present level of definition. Although the expressions of risk approximate the
relative cost risk between architectures, the reader is cautioned against using the results
obtained from this methodology to predict absolute dollar amounts or to estimate
required levels of program reserves.
The Architecture Cost Risk was determined to be a function of three primarily
parameters, or subattributes:
(1) the technical challenge (TC) of the individual systems comprising the architecture.
The TC represents the degree to which a transportation system's technology deviates
from current technology. The technologies of the candidate systems ranged from being
essentially off the shelf, to essentially entirely new technologies. The TC of
transportation systems can be determined independent of the architecture those
systems are in.
(2) the program immaturity (PI) of the individual systems comprising the architecture.
The PI represents the current actual state of definition of a system, based primarily
upon a current drawing count. The PI of transportation systems can be determined
independent of the architecture those systems are in.
(3) the number of new systems (NS) that comprise the architecture. The NS is simply
the count of the number of new systems in the candidate architecture, with credit
acknowledged for families of systems. This is a direct architecture level measurement.
In addition, it was the consensus of the NIT that the contribution of each subattribute to
the overall architecture cost risk was determined to be as follows:
Technical Challenge 45%
Program Immaturity 30%
Number of New Systems 25%
J
Measurement of the Attribute
Technical Challenge.
The relative technical challenge of eachsystem comprising the architectures was
assessed by the HTS team. This was accomplished by determining the TC of each of the
phases in the life cycle of each system comprising the architectures: the development, or
non-recurring phase (which includes DDT&E, non-recurring production, facilities, and
pre-planned product improvemen0, the production phase, and the operations phase.
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These were then cost-weighted for each phase by the cost of that phase:The relative
assessment of TC for each phase was made by having each NIT member assess an
integer value from I (least technical challenge) to 10 (most technical challenge) to each
phase of each system. A consensus value was then selected to represent the assessment
of the NIT. Table 5.2.4-1 provides the consensus results of this phase-level assessment,
along with the range of inputs received during the process.
TABLE 5.2.4-1.- PHASE-LEVEL TECHNICAL CHALLENGE
FOR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
System
AMLS
AMSC
ACRV
Atlas
Atlas Evolution
Atlas/Delta/Titan (LTI-
Beta II
!CLV
CRV
_'I'V
Delta
LRV
MLS
HR Titan
NASP Derived Vehicle
NLS-1
NLS-2
NLS -3
RCV
RPC
RUPC
Space Shuttle
Shuttle Evolution
Non- Range Production Range Operations Range
Recun'ing TC TC
TC
7 5-7 6 4-7 6 4-7
6 3-7 4 3-7 6 5-9
3 2-4 2 1-4 3 2-5
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2-3 1 1-2 1 1-2
4 2-7 2 1-4 3 1-7
8 7-10 7 5-9 8 6-9
5 2-6 3 1-5 3 1-5
4 2-5 3 1-5 !3 1-5
4 2-5 3 1-5 3 1-5
1 '1 1 1 1 1
3 2-5 3 1-5 2 1-5
4 3-5 4 3-5 3 3-4
3 2-5 2 1-2 3 2-4
10 10 10 10 9 9-10
i4 3-6 4 3-5 3 3-4
4 3-6 4 3-5 3 3-4
4 3-6 4 3-5 3 3-4
3 2-4 2 1-3 3 2-3
5 2-5 3 1-5 3 3-7
8 5-9 6 5-7 3 3-8
1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2-4 2 1-2 3 2-4
9 5-10 6 4-10 9 6-9
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
3 2-4 2 1-4 2 1-2
3 2-4 2 1-4 2 1-2
SSTO (Rocket)
Titan II
Titan IV
Titan IV Evolution
HR Titan
NonRec = Non Recurring; Prod = Production; Ops = Operations; R = Range
=
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Program Immaturity_.
The relative PI of each system comprising the architectures was assessed by the HTS
team. The relative assessment was made by having each NIT member assess an integer
value from I (least program immaturity) to 10 (most program immaturity) based upon a
predefined, common level of current drawing counts. The program immaturity scale
with the explanation of the program immaturity levels is provided in Table 5.2.4-2.
TABLE 5.2.4-2.- HTS PROGRAM IMMATURITY SCALE
Rank
1
2
3
Explanation
Virtually 100 percent of the drawings exist and need not be
renumbered; the continuation of an existing product.
Predominant number of drawings exist; drawings may have
been renumbered.
Majority of drawings exist; minor resizing of hardware is
possible.
4 Roughly half of the drawings exist; significant resizing of
hardware is possible.
5 Only a minority of drawings exist; however, existing drawings
are based on a familiar product line.
6
7
8
9
10
Drawings are essentially new; however, a design point-of-
departure is known to exist.
Drawings are new, the mission of the design are, in part,
unfamiliar.
Drawings are new, either mission or design concept is
unfamiliar.
Drawings are new, both mission and design concepts are
unfamiliar.
Drawings are new and the design concepts transcend the state-
of-the-art.
i
A consensus value was then selected to represent the assessment of the NIT. Table
5.2.4-3 provides the consensus results of this assessment, along with the range of inputs
received during the process.
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TABLE 5.Z4-3.- SYSTEM LEVEL PROGRAM IMMATURITY
FOR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
System
Element List
AMLS
iAMSC
ACRV
Atlas
Atlas Evolution
Arias/Delta/Titan C-11_
Beta II
CLV
CRV
CIV
Delta
LRV
MLS-HL, MLS-X
HR Titan
NASP Derived Vehicle
NLS-1
NLS-2
NLS-3
RCV
RPC
RUPC
Space Shuttle
Shuttle Evolution
SSTO (Rocket)
Titan 1I
Titan IV
Titan IV Evolution
HR Titan I_
System List
Atlas/Delta CTF
CLV/MLS-HL
CRV/MLS
CTV/NLS-1
LRV/NLS-1
RPC/MLS-X
RPC/HR Titan IV
RPC/_2
RPC/LRV/MLS-HL
Titan I_/RUIK:
Program
knmaturlt 7
8
7
5
1
3
6
10
7
7
6
1
7
6
4
10
6
6
6
4
i
6
7
1
4
8
1
1
4
3
6
7
7
6
6
6
6
Range
6-9
6-9
4-7
1
2-4
4-8
9-10
6-8
6-8
5-8
1
6-8
5-7
3-6
10
4-7
4-7
4-7
3-4
4-7
6-8
1
3-4
7-10
1
1
3-4
2-4
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Number of New Systems.
The number of new systems comprising the architectures was assessed by the HTS
team. Families of systems in an architecture were evaluated for the number of distinctly
new systems represented by that family; in other words, a family was given credit for
having less than the stated number of new systems. A consensus value was then
selected to represent the assessment of the NIT. Table 5.2.4-4 provides the consensus
results of this assessment, along with the range of inputs received during the process.
TABLE 5.2.4-4.- NUMBER OF NEW SYSTEMS
ACRV
AMSC
Atlas Evolution
System
Arias/Delta CTF
Beta II
CRV
CRV
Number of New
Systems
1.0
1.0
0.2
1.0
1.7
1.0
1.0
1.0
Range
0.8-1.0
1.0-1.2
0.1-0.3
0.7-1.0
1.0-2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0CTV
LRV 1.0 1.0
MLS-X + RPC, MLS-HL 2.8 2.2-3.0
MLS-X and MLS-HL/CLV 2.7 2.0-3.0
MINX, MLS-HL + CLV 2.7 2.0-3.0
HR Titan II + RUPC 1.4 1.2-1.5
1.2-1.7HR Titan W + RPC 1.4
NLS-1,2 (w/AUS) 1.6 1.2-2.5
NLS-1,2 + RPC 2.5 2.2-2.6
NLS-1,2,3 (w/AUS), 2.5 2.24.0
NLS-1,2 + RPC 2.5 2.2-2.6
NL,9-1,2,3 (w/AUS), 2.5 2.2-4.0
N[S-1,2,3 + RPC 3.4 33-3-5
SSTO 1.0 1.0
STS Evolution + RCV 1.0 0.5-1.1
Titan CTF 1.0 0.9-1.0
Titan Evolution 0.5 0.1-0.8
Total Architecture Cost Risk.
To make the relative linear assessment of TC and PI more closely approximate the
impact of TC and PI on the cost risk experienced on real programs, an algorithm was
developed to spread the consensus input TC values prior to developing the final
relative architecture cost risk. That algorithm was then applied to spread the TC for
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each phase of each system and the PI for each system. This more closely approximates
the experience reflected in more sophisticated cost uncertainty models, which show that
"beating" themidrange or nominal estimate for TC and PI does not appreciably mitigate
the risk, while "underestimating" the TC and PI result in substantial cost risk.
The TC for each system was then derived by cost-weighting the exponentially spread
values of TC for each phase by the total cost of that phase. The total architecture TC is
the sum of the cost-weighted TC for each system in that architecture.
The PI for the entire architecture was derived by weighting the exponentially spread
values of PI for each system by the flight rate of that system in that architecture to
account for the impact of the relative usage rate of the individual systems.
Refer to the final report for the architecture-level risk values.
5.2.5 Launch Schedule Confidence
Definition
•This attribute is an indication of an architecture's ability to meet its launch schedules.
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Measurement of the Attribute
The Launch Schedule Confidence attribute has three parts. Each is measured separately
and combined.
Schedule Compression.
This is a measure of a system's ability to make up schedule slips by extending shifts to
the processing flow. The operations flows for each system are analyzed to determine
the critical paths. Those parts of the ground operations flow that are in the critical path
are boosted to 7-day-a-week operation along with increasing the shift size by 50 percent.
For example, if the nominal processing flow has one shift, the compressed flow would
have one and one-half shifts. This shows the effect of not hiring new crews, but having
the existing ones work overtime. The difference between this compressed flow time
and the nominal flow time, in days, is divided by the nominal processing time to give a
feeling for how long the added time is relative to the normal process flow. This number
is then multiplied by the number of flights per year for the system. This indicates the
reliance of the given architecture on this system. The values for each system are then
summed for each year, and then the annual values are summed and divided by the total
number of flights of all systems in the architecture.
Schedule Margin.
This is a measure of a system's ability to make up schedule slips by using excess
facilities and personnel. The difference between the nominal flight rate and the design
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flight rate is converted to a number of days. This is divided by the nominal processing
time to indicate the added time relative to the normal process flow. This number is then
multiplied by the number of flights per year for the system. This indicates the reliance
of the given architecture on this system. The values for each system are then summed
for each year, and then the annual values are summed and divided by the total number
of flights of all systems in this architecture.
Percentage of flights with delays.
This is a measure of a launch system's likelihood to have a launch delay based on
unscheduled maintenance items occurring at critical times in the flow. This
measurement does not, however, attempt to measure the length of the delays. The
mass, complexity, and mission length for each system are used to calculate a number of
unscheduled maintenance action items that the system would experience each time it is
used. Judgments, based on Space Shuttle experience and sensitivities of airline-type
operations to delays, are used to determine how many of those unscheduled actions
appear in the critical path of flight countdown, and how many of those actually cause a
delay. The architecture value is a flight-rate-weighted average of the percent delays of
every system in the architecture.
System Results
Refer to the final report for system and architecture results.
5.2.6 Environment
Definition
The definition of the Environment attribute, as determined by the NIT, is the degree to
which a given architecturehas a long term effect on the Earth's environment during the
course of nominal space launch operations. Note that this definition is meant to exclude
manufacturing processes and materials, also excluded are abort situations where the
immediate preservation of human life is assumed to take precedence.
Measurement of the Attribute
Mankind's relationship with the Earth's environment has been the focus of much
attention in the recent past. The NIT consensus was that the decision makers are
sensitive to public scrutiny of any space program and would not want to ignore the
popular concern for the environment. Effects on the environment can result from
several distinct mechanisms. Only the effect on the environment caused by launch
vehicle effluents through the atmosphere were considered in this study.
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The most consistent and readily available data to this study for assessing environmental
impacts was a comparison of exhaust effluents using equilibrium chemistry calculated
at the exit plan on the rocket engine(s). Using these chemical equilibrium calculation
tools, all the candidate launch- vehicle elements were analyzed to arrive at a total
effluent mass by specie (CO, CO2, H2, H20, HC1, N2, OH, H, and A1203 were
considered). This was multiplied by the number of launch vehicle flights in the
architecture to get a total environmental impact metric.
An attempt was made to derive a weighted score for each exhaust product based on a
perceived environmental impact. This impact factor is multiplied by each species mass
to get the weighted score. To properly arrive at an environmental impact factor would
involve much research and complex biosphere models. In this simplistic approach, five
key types of environmental concern were simultaneously considered to subjectively
select an average figure of relative environmental impact that would result from the
introduction of a particular chemical into the atmosphere. These concerns included:
Ozone depletion
Acid rain
Cloud nucleation
Greenhouse gases
Particulates
Each effect should ideally be compared separately to the natural background variability
and to other anthropogenic sources. For the purposes of this study, however, the
impact factors used in developing a weighted score considered these effects. Refer to
the final report for additional detail.
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5.3 ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
To understand whether a particular vehicle design option should be built, it must be
viewed in the context of the other elements which will be used to provide the total
transportation capability. We called this grouping of transportation elements an
architecture. Because an evaluation of a design option's characteristics and attributes
can only be evaluated in the context of what mission requirements it meets and which
vehicles are available to carry a required payload, it is impossible to evaluate, for
example, a PLS without an architectural context.
We defined an architecture as the total group of elements flaunch vehicles, boosters,
capsules, etc.), with their associated capabilities and infrastructure, which are providing
transportation access to space over some defined period of time. As will be described
below, we constructed this architecture set by selecting a series of considerations
important to the customer, and then selecting the group of elements which, in
conjunction, provide a set of launch capabilities. The elements in the architecture were
then manifested to meet the HTS Needs Model, and attribute values (cost, safety, risk,
etc.) for each architecture were calculated to provide a quantitative assessment of how
potential concepts fared relative to one another.
Figure 5.3-1 is a flow chart showing how input data from various sources was used in
the study and the relationships between data input and output in the process of an
architecture's evaluation.
_ i: ¸._
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Hgure 5.3-1.- Study data flow.
5.3.1 Architecture Options Development
The architecture set for the HTS study was developed to gain understanding into a set
of considerations or issues which will affect the design of the next human space
transportation vehicle. These considerations are described in section 2.2. The
architectures were comprised of elements which provided crew and cargo delivery and
return functions from 1992 to 2020.
To understand the impact of these considerations on future system options, we
compared a set of architectures for each consideration. For example, to understand the
separation of people and cargo, we constructed three architectures. The first kept
people and cargo together by using the Space Shuttle or a miniature "Shuttle" for
Human Receipt at Destination payloads. The second completely separated the two,
with the crew going to orbit in a personnel carrier, and the cargo aboard a separate ELV.
The two would then be required to rendezvous on-orbit to complete the mission. The
third separated people and cargo into distinct crew and cargo modules which were
launched on the same launch vehicle. These three architectures were then manifested
and their attributes were evaluated. A similar approach was taken for the other
considerations.
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Approximately 30 distinctarchitectures were identifiedfor study, which was
subsequently narrowed to 18 afterreview and consensus from the HTS Study Team.
From thisgroup, three were subsequently deferred due to the unavailabilityof data on
the primary human dements of that architecture. For each architecture, we identified
which elements would provide people-up (delivery), people-down (return), cargo-up,
and cargo-down functions. Elements were phased in five-year increments from 2000 to
2015. This was a simplifying assumption since we believed a 1 or 2 year difference in
vehicle IOC would have a small impact on the overall architecture cost, risk etc. No
vehicles were phased in or out prior to 2000 since we felt it was unlikely that NASA will
introduce new systems prior to this date. Finally, for each architecture, a set of
manifesting philosophies were developed which governed how an element would be
used. This allowed us to assign priority, consistent with the architecture intent, to
different vehicles which could carry the same payload. Figure 5.3.1-1 shows an example
template for a representative architecture and Figure 5.3.1-2 provides a summary of the
architectures considered in the study. A detailed explanation of these architectures is
provided in the final report.
[ Function J
I_ople Up
People Down
Cargo Up
Cargo Down
I 2OOO
• 8hurtle
• 8hurtle
• ACRV
-8hurtle
•Titan, Arias,
Delta
-Shuttle
J l 2oos
-Shuttle
-hL_.le
• Tits,,, Arias,
Delta
• 8huttlo
[ 2010 J
• 8huf:flo
• 8huttlo
• ACRV
.Shu_Jo
• Titan, Atlas,
Delta
• 8huttlo
[ 2015
-Shuttlo
-ShuttJto
• Titan, Atlas,
Delta
-Shuttlo
Figure 5.3.1-1.- Example architecture template.
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Figure 5.3.1-2.- Architecture summary.
In addition, other analyses, beyond the evaluation of the above considerations, were
conducted. For example, to assess the impact of return cargo requirements, we selected
a group of architectures and modified the needs model by reducing return cargo
requirements. The architectttres were then remanifested and compared with the
baseline results.
The I-ITS architecture set is broad enough to gain insight into other considerations. For
example, comparison of the reference architecture (continued use of current systems)
with the architecture that adds the NLS gives insight into how many payloads could be
off-loaded from the Space Shuttle onto the new launch vehicle. One could also gain
insight into the effect of Shuttle system phase-out dates by comparing architectures with
early and late Shuttle phase-outs. One should use caution, however, in trying to get
absolute answers from these architectures (e.g., how many more shuttles NASA should
buy), since the architectures and the subsequent attribute scores are better suited for
comparative purposes. In other words, the study is better suited to understanding
architectural implications of new system alternatives compared to continued use of
current systems. It is not intended to answer detailed issues within a given alternative.
We have however, gone into sufficient accuracy and depth to meet the objectives of the
HTS study.
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5.3.2 Transportation Elements and Systems
The process of populating the architectures with element or vehicle concepts was more
difficult than developing the theme of the architectures themselves. We identified a list
of roughly 25 elements which could be incorporated into the architectures. Many of
these elements were selected not only on their ability to fill a capability or function gap
in some architecture set but also to incorporate concepts which are well known and are
having resources devoted to study them. For example, we felt it was important to know
how a PLS or an SDI SSTO vehicle fit into the spectrum of possible design and
architecture concepts. In the end, we were largely able to incorporate most of the
concepts we felt were of principal interest to the customer.
Table 5.3.2-1 shows a summary of the elements used in the study. The table identifies in
which architectures these elements appear as well as their phase-in and phase-out dates.
Small commercial vehicles (Pegasus, Taurus, Conestoga, etc.) and sounding rockets
(Scout, Aires, etc.) were not considered in this study since it was believed that their
use/flight rates would have a negligible impact on an architecture's attributes. Detailed
descriptions of these elements are provided in the final report.
TABLE 5.3.2-1.- HTS ARCHITECTURE ELEMENTS AND OPERATION PHASES
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5.4 ARCHITECTURE RESULTS
The following tables and figures summarize both final architecture attribute values, as
well as the relative scores, of the set of 18 architectures. An architecture's score is
determined by rolling-up the respective attribute values for each architecture using
utility curves and the study team consensus of the attribute weightings. These
weightings were determined by considering what the customer would feel were most
important. If the customer has different weightings or desires to understand the
sensitivity of the answer to different weightings, the raw data can be used to generate
new architecture scores. The study team weighted the six study attributes as follows:
Human Safety
Funding Profile
Probability of Mission Success
Architecture Cost Risk
Latm.ch Schedule Confidence
Environmental Impact
29%
27%
19%
13%
8%
4%
Detailed architectural examinations of these architectures, as well the considerations
(e.g., alternate access), can be found in the final report.-
There are two sets of data presented in Tables 5.4-1 through 5.4-12 and Figures 5.4-1
through 5.4-12: the first is the baseline set of values. This summarizes 15 of the 18
study architectures; three architectures could not be completely assessed due to
incomplete data. The second set resulted from corrections and modifications made
primarily to the Human Safety and PMS attributes, plus an additional nineteenth
architecture added near the end of the study. Note that the values don't change
significantly, although the modified set has, in general, lower crew losses and
unreliability costs. None of the conclusions are changed as a result of these
modifications.
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Figure 5.4--I.-HTS architecturescores-"If"scenario A (baseline).
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Figure 5.4-3.- HTS architecture scores - "If" scenario C (baseline).
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Figure 5.4-4.- HTS architecture scores - '_P' scenario D (baseline).
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Figure 5.4-5.- HTS architecture scores - "It" scenario E-Low (b_e).
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Figure 5.4-6.- HTS arch2tecture scores - "If" scenario E-High (baseline).
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Figure 5.4-7.- I-rrs architecture scores - 'If" scenario A (updated).
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